Under the hood
Technical details.
For the curious. Parts marked planned aren't built yet.
The technology we use


- Debian 13The base of ZOOMRIYA OS
- SvelteKitThe apps' screens
- FastAPIEach app's services
- PostgreSQLOne database per app
- ValkeyEvents between apps
- QdrantSimilar images and faces
- SigLIPPhoto search in words
- PaddleOCRWords in photos and scans
- Gemma + llama.cppMyira
- systemdServices, safe updates, rollback
Connections
| Who | At home | Away from home (planned, late 2027) |
|---|---|---|
| Phones (ZOOMRIYA app) | Wi-Fi, direct | iroh over QUIC: direct and relay tried at once; direct takes over |
| Laptops (browser extension) | WebRTC on the home network | WebRTC, set up through the relay |
| Guests (any browser) | — | Straight to the box, then WebRTC, then the relay |
| Your Cloudflare Tunnel | Direct | Sealed connection over HTTPS, through Cloudflare |
Every connection is checked against the key from pairing.
| What | At home | Away |
|---|---|---|
| Location, chat, notifications | Yes | Yes |
| Browsing photos | Full quality | Previews; full size on tap |
| Photo backup | Automatic | Wi-Fi; mobile data if allowed |
| Videos and big downloads | Full quality | Lighter, or wait for home |
| Way | In the middle | It sees |
|---|---|---|
| 1. A ZOOMRIYA name (default) | Our relay, if needed | Who, when, how much |
| 2. Your domain, through ZOOMRIYA | Our relay, if needed | Who, when, how much |
| 3. Your own Connect server | Your relay | Who, when, how much; only you see it |
| 4. Your Cloudflare Tunnel | Cloudflare, always | Who, when, how much, and shared albums |
No router setup in any of them. The full comparison
Encryption


| What | How | Who holds the key |
|---|---|---|
| Family Vault | A key per file, behind a PIN | You; a recovery key is printed once |
| Private chats | End-to-end, with a published, open protocol | The two phones only |
| Family group chats | Encrypted on disk | The box |
| Connections away from home | End-to-end, any route | Your device and your box |
| Notifications | No content, only “something new” | Nothing to hold |
| The box's disk | Not encrypted, so your files still open on another computer if the box fails | — |
Open code
AGPL-3.0ZOOMRIYA OSUpdates, storage, sign-in limits, Box Desktopgithub.com/zoomriya/zoomriya-os
AGPL-3.0ZOOMRIYA ConnectAccess away from home, and the relaygithub.com/zoomriya/zoomriya-connect
AGPL-3.0ZOOMRIYA IDThe family's sign-ingithub.com/zoomriya/zoomriya-id
Planned: the phone app's encryption code, and an independent security review published in full.
ZOOMRIYA ConnectIf you use access away from home
Apple or Google notificationsOnly “something new”, if you turn them on
Software updatesSecurity fixes, at a quiet hour
Strict offline modeTurns them all off
Outside connections
The only ones the box can make, each with its own switch (planned).
On an iPhone, App Privacy Report should show only your box and ZOOMRIYA Connect.
Why it matters
Personal data is valuable, and it leaks. In Canada alone:
$704M+
lost to fraud in Canada in 2025
Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre
112,000+
fraud reports in 2025, identity fraud the top type
Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre
451
breaches at federal institutions alone in 2025–26
Privacy Commissioner of Canada
Limits
- Photos and placesNot encrypted on the box's disk, on purpose: anyone holding the drive can read them. The box stays at home.
- Family group chatsThe box's admin can open them.
- Private chatsPhones only at first; lose every device, lose the history.
- Family VaultNo PIN and no recovery key: nobody can open it.
- ZOOMRIYA ConnectSees devices, addresses and timing. Never content.
- Live PhotosMotion kept only when photo and video arrive together.
- Words in photosUnaccented English letters and numbers only, for now.
- Guest linksRecord when they're opened.
- Speed away from homeLimited by your home's upload speed.